Commit Graph

14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kees Cook e71fac0172 KPTI: Rename to PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
This renames CONFIG_KAISER to CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:35 +01:00
Borislav Petkov 59094faf3f x86/kaiser: Move feature detection up
... before the first use of kaiser_enabled as otherwise funky
things happen:

  about to get started...
  (XEN) d0v0 Unhandled page fault fault/trap [#14, ec=0000]
  (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff88022a449090:
  (XEN)  L4[0x110] = 0000000229e0e067 0000000000001e0e
  (XEN)  L3[0x008] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff
  (XEN) domain_crash_sync called from entry.S: fault at ffff82d08033fd08
  entry.o#create_bounce_frame+0x135/0x14d
  (XEN) Domain 0 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#0:
  (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.9.1_02-3.21  x86_64  debug=n   Not tainted ]----
  (XEN) CPU:    0
  (XEN) RIP:    e033:[<ffffffff81007460>]
  (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000286   EM: 1   CONTEXT: pv guest (d0v0)

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:35 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 169b369f99 kaiser: use ALTERNATIVE instead of x86_cr3_pcid_noflush
Now that we're playing the ALTERNATIVE game, use that more efficient
method: instead of user-mapping an extra page, and reading an extra
cacheline each time for x86_cr3_pcid_noflush.

Neel has found that __stringify(bts $X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, %rax)
is a working substitute for the "bts $63, %rax" in these ALTERNATIVEs;
but the one line with $63 in looks clearer, so let's stick with that.

Worried about what happens with an ALTERNATIVE between the jump and
jump label in another ALTERNATIVE?  I was, but have checked the
combinations in SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3_NO_STACK at entry_SYSCALL_64,
and it does a good job.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:35 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 23e09439aa kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVE
Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid".
Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not
CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S
and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which
patches in the preferred instructions at runtime.  That technique
is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER is fabricated.

Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that,
but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when
nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser -
neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL
won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4.
By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled,
all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes.

It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of
kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files
(asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h).  I felt safer that way,
than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not
feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes
them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch.

Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed
the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some
comments.  But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64:
the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when
4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on
BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask().

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 05ddad146d kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
Neel Natu points out that paranoid_entry() was wrong to assume that
an entry that did not need swapgs would not need SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3:
paranoid_entry (used for debug breakpoint, int3, double fault or MCE;
though I think it's only the MCE case that is cause for concern here)
can break in at an awkward time, between cr3 switch and swapgs, but
its handling always needs kernel gs and kernel cr3.

Easy to fix in itself, but paranoid_entry() also needs to convey to
paranoid_exit() (and my reading of macro idtentry says paranoid_entry
and paranoid_exit are always paired) how to restore the prior state.
The swapgs state is already conveyed by %ebx (0 or 1), so extend that
also to convey when SWITCH_USER_CR3 will be needed (2 or 3).

(Yes, I'd much prefer that 0 meant no swapgs, whereas it's the other
way round: and a convention shared with error_entry() and error_exit(),
which I don't want to touch.  Perhaps I should have inverted the bit
for switch cr3 too, but did not.)

paranoid_exit() would be straightforward, except for TRACE_IRQS: it
did TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ when doing swapgs, but TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
when not: which is it supposed to use when SWITCH_USER_CR3 is split
apart from that?  As best as I can determine, commit 5963e317b1
("ftrace/x86: Do not change stacks in DEBUG when calling lockdep")
missed the swapgs case, and should have used TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
there too (the discrepancy has nothing to do with the liberal use
of _NO_STACK and _UNSAFE_STACK hereabouts: TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG has
just been used in all cases); discrepancy lovingly preserved across
several paranoid_exit() cleanups, but I'm now removing it.

Neel further indicates that to use SWITCH_USER_CR3_NO_STACK there in
paranoid_exit() is now not only unnecessary but unsafe: might corrupt
syscall entry's unsafe_stack_register_backup of %rax.  Just use
SWITCH_USER_CR3: and delete SWITCH_USER_CR3_NO_STACK altogether,
before we make the mistake of using it again.

hughd adds: this commit fixes an issue in the Kaiser-without-PCIDs
part of the series, and ought to be moved earlier, if you decided
to make a release of Kaiser-without-PCIDs.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins d0142ceb79 kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
Mostly this commit is just unshouting X86_CR3_PCID_KERN_VAR and
X86_CR3_PCID_USER_VAR: we usually name variables in lower-case.

But why does x86_cr3_pcid_noflush need to be __aligned(PAGE_SIZE)?
Ah, it's a leftover from when kaiser_add_user_map() once complained
about mapping the same page twice.  Make it __read_mostly instead.
(I'm a little uneasy about all the unrelated data which shares its
page getting user-mapped too, but that was so before, and not a big
deal: though we call it user-mapped, it's not mapped with _PAGE_USER.)

And there is a little change around the two calls to do_nmi().
Previously they set the NOFLUSH bit (if PCID supported) when
forcing to kernel context before do_nmi(); now they also have the
NOFLUSH bit set (if PCID supported) when restoring context after:
nothing done in do_nmi() should require a TLB to be flushed here.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 6a2b411761 kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
Why was 4 chosen for kernel PCID and 6 for user PCID?
No good reason in a backport where PCIDs are only used for Kaiser.

If we continue with those, then we shall need to add Andy Lutomirski's
4.13 commit 6c690ee1039b ("x86/mm: Split read_cr3() into read_cr3_pa()
and __read_cr3()"), which deals with the problem of read_cr3() callers
finding stray bits in the cr3 that they expected to be page-aligned;
and for hibernation, his 4.14 commit f34902c5c6c0 ("x86/hibernate/64:
Mask off CR3's PCID bits in the saved CR3").

But if 0 is used for kernel PCID, then there's no need to add in those
commits - whenever the kernel looks, it sees 0 in the lower bits; and
0 for kernel seems an obvious choice.

And I naughtily propose 128 for user PCID.  Because there's a place
in _SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 where it takes note of the need for TLB FLUSH,
but needs to reset that to NOFLUSH for the next occasion.  Currently
it does so with a "movb $(0x80)" into the high byte of the per-cpu
quadword, but that will cause a machine without PCID support to crash.
Now, if %al just happened to have 0x80 in it at that point, on a
machine with PCID support, but 0 on a machine without PCID support...

(That will go badly wrong once the pgd can be at a physical address
above 2^56, but even with 5-level paging, physical goes up to 2^52.)

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 0b5ca9d995 kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
We have many machines (Westmere, Sandybridge, Ivybridge) supporting
PCID but not INVPCID: on these load_new_mm_cr3() simply crashed.

Flushing user context inside load_new_mm_cr3() without the use of
invpcid is difficult: momentarily switch from kernel to user context
and back to do so?  I'm not sure whether that can be safely done at
all, and would risk polluting user context with kernel internals,
and kernel context with stale user externals.

Instead, follow the hint in the comment that was there: change
X86_CR3_PCID_USER_VAR to be a per-cpu variable, then load_new_mm_cr3()
can leave a note in it, for SWITCH_USER_CR3 on return to userspace to
flush user context TLB, instead of default X86_CR3_PCID_USER_NOFLUSH.

Which works well enough that there's no need to do it this way only
when invpcid is unsupported: it's a good alternative to invpcid here.
But there's a couple of inlines in asm/tlbflush.h that need to do the
same trick, so it's best to localize all this per-cpu business in
mm/kaiser.c: moving that part of the initialization from setup_pcid()
to kaiser_setup_pcid(); with kaiser_flush_tlb_on_return_to_user() the
function for noting an X86_CR3_PCID_USER_FLUSH.  And let's keep a
KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET in there, to avoid the extra OR on exit.

I did try to make the feature tests in asm/tlbflush.h more consistent
with each other: there seem to be far too many ways of performing such
tests, and I don't have a good grasp of their differences.  At first
I converted them all to be static_cpu_has(): but that proved to be a
mistake, as the comment in __native_flush_tlb_single() hints; so then
I reversed and made them all this_cpu_has().  Probably all gratuitous
change, but that's the way it's working at present.

I am slightly bothered by the way non-per-cpu X86_CR3_PCID_KERN_VAR
gets re-initialized by each cpu (before and after these changes):
no problem when (as usual) all cpus on a machine have the same
features, but in principle incorrect.  However, my experiment
to per-cpu-ify that one did not end well...

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 2684b12a16 kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
Merged performance improvements to Kaiser, using distinct kernel
and user Process Context Identifiers to minimize the TLB flushing.

[This work actually all from Dave Hansen 2017-08-30:
still omitting trackswitch mods, and KAISER_REAL_SWITCH deleted.]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:34 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 1ce27de401 kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
We fail to see what CONFIG_KAISER_REAL_SWITCH is for: it seems to be
left over from early development, and now just obscures tricky parts
of the code.  Delete it before adding PCIDs, or nokaiser boot option.

(Or if there is some good reason to keep the option, then it needs
a help text - and a "depends on KAISER", so that all those without
KAISER are not asked the question.  But we'd much rather delete it.)

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:33 +01:00
Hugh Dickins c27cdea56c kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
There's a 0x1000 in various places, which looks better with a name.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:33 +01:00
Hugh Dickins 67fab0d4ac kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
Mainly deleting a surfeit of blank lines, and reflowing header comment.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:33 +01:00
Dave Hansen 8f0baadf2b kaiser: merged update
Merged fixes and cleanups, rebased to 4.9.51 tree (no 5-level paging).

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:32 +01:00
Richard Fellner 13be4483bb KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149390087310405&w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
To: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

[patch based also on
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IAIK/KAISER/master/KAISER/0001-KAISER-Kernel-Address-Isolation.patch]

Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:46:32 +01:00